analytical methods. This is what has been undertaken in the present investigation, which was conducted in the Hungarian textile weaving mills.3 As far as the authors know, this is the first attempt in the Hungarian economics literature to clarify the disputed problems of financial incentives by the use of mathematical methods.
THE PROBLEM
In this investigation both linear and nonlinear programming methods have been used. The mathematical apparatus is itself fairly simple. The reader may, however, consider the approach to the problem to be novel.
When an economist in a capitalist country constructs a mathematical model of a programming scheme, he must first establish the true business interests of the economic unit, e.g., the firm being investigated. These interests are then expressed in the objective function of his programming. The business interests of the firm are given, determined by the relations of production and economic processes. The task of the economist is mainly to translate the given business interest into the language of mathematics.
The situation in a Socialist economy is different. Here the concrete interests of the firm are shaped by the government, through the measures the government takes. If bonuses paid to the directors and other heads of firms are made by the government to depend mainly on increasing the quantity of production, as was generally the case between 1950 and 1956, then the "firms' interest" is mainly to achieve maximum output. If, on the other hand, the government attaches larger financial rewards to increasing profits, then the "firm's interest" will be mainly to achieve maximum profits, and so forth. The wage and bonus systems and profit sharing are instrsnments in the hands of the State to guide the activities of the firm so as to correspond to the plan for the whole economy.
It hence follows that the problem was not investigated simply from the point of view of the present interests of the firm. Two alternative systems of incentives were made the subject of a parallel investigation, and attention was focused precisely on comparing the effects that each of these systems has on the firm's behaviour. Thus, the purpose was not merely to provide practical advice to the firm on how to achieve an increase in its profit share within the given system of incentives (although it was regarded as important 3 The authors have, on a commission from the Hungarian Ministry of Light Industries, written a longer study which has appeared as a book under the title "The Mathematical Investigation of Profit Sharing Incentives" (A nyeresiglrdekeltseg matematikai vizsg lata), Budapest, 1959, Kozgazdas'agi 6s Jogi Konyvkiado. This paper contains some of the findings of that book, considerably abbreviated. For the sake of brevity, the authors have omitted detailed mathematical deductions. Numerous problems discussed in the book are here not mentioned at all. to develop practical numerical-graphical programming procedures that could be used by firms). The purpose was also to give the economic administration a basis for deciding which incentive system to choose if it wishes the interests of the firm to conform as closely as possible to the general economic policies of the State. This is related to the broader problem of whether the microeconomic optimum determined by programming for a firm simultaneously ensures the attainment of the macroeconomic optimum, or not. The present investigation did not pose this problem in its entirety. In this respect the scope of research was limited in the following manner:
(1) The system of profit sharing is only one of the instruments of the economic administration. There are also numerous other means available, e.g., direct plan instructions, the central distribution of certain raw materials, the credit system, the central control of prices, etc. Whether the operations of the firm are favourable from the standpoint of the interests of the economy as a whole depends on the joint effect of all factors. The present investigation, however, generally accepted the organizational forms of economic administration, the economic-institutional "milieu" in which the activities of firms are carried on, as given-except for some of the principles of profit sharing and price determination under investigation.
(2) It was presumed that the interests of the economy as a whole are expressed by the economic policies of the central administration. A decision by a firm will, therefore, help to achieve the macroeconomic optimum if it exerts an influence in the direction set by State economic policies.
The present research may, therefore, with these reservations, be regarded as a first, simpler, and inevitably one-sided approximation to the broader scope of the "microeconomic versus macroeconomic optimum" problem.
THE MODEL
This investigation is specifically confined to the short-run decisions of the firm.
The firm to be discussed manufactures n varieties of articles. Let xl, x2,..., xnbe the individual outputs of articles 1, 2, .. ., n, respectively. The ensemble of (xl, x2,.. ., xn) is the outputprogram. The quantity
is the firm's total output.
The unit of output chosen should, if possible, be a technical parameter, a natural (not monetary) unit of measurement, which adequately reflects the utilization of machinery, independently of the actual articles for whose production the capacity was used. In the textile weaving mills, which consti-tuted the closer subject of the investigation, the pick count proved to be the most suitable unit of measurement.4
The assumptions basic to the model are the following: Assumfption 1. The total production cost C incurred by the firm depends solely on the output program. Changes in prices, wages, productivity, etc., are neglected, that is, the principle of "ceteris paribus" is applied.
Assumption 2. Costs within the firm are composed of two parts: individual costs and overall costs. The overall cost function G depends only on the firm's total output:
On the other hand, the individual cost function K is a homogeneous linear function of the individual outputs of the various articles:
The coefficients k1, k2,..., kn in the above are the individual unit costs of the articles concerned. The resultant cost function of the firm is thus of the form This decomposition of costs differs from that usually applied. As far as the authors know it has not previously been used in output programming models.5 In their opinion, however, this assumption leads to an acceptable approximation to the actual cost relations pertaining in the textile industry. This has been substantiated by statistical investigations and consultations with the textile engineers of the firms concerned. 4 The traditional engineering practice that has evolved in the textile weaving mills is to measure the performance of looms by the pick count. The weaving mills perform numerous processes (the preparation of the yarn, etc.), but the decisive phase is weaving itself. The technical performance of the loom may therefore adequately represent the utilization, the degree of employment of the whole mill. It is possible technically to determine the maximum number of picks in a given period of time, and the upper limit of output may thus be determined independently of the actual articles the looms are producing.
5 It is this decomposition of costs that makes it possible-as will be shown-even in the case of a nonlinear cost function to program the manufacture of several articles by a relatively simple procedure, as opposed to the usual method of marginal analysis which generally assumes the manufacture of one article. This, however, makes it necessary to introduce new concepts and relations, corresponding to the nature of individual and overall costs, instead of the usual ones of average cost, marginal cost, etc.
The decomposition of costs into individual and overall costs and the description of the individual cost function as a homogeneous linear function imply the following simplifications:
(a) All the so-called progressive costs of production are included in the overall costs. A part of these is, in fact, essentially independent of what articles the factory produces, and of the individual characteristics of the various articles. (Progressive costs of this type are, e.g., the cost of lighting during the night shift. This is obviously independent of the exact nature of the articles produced by the night shift.) Another part of progressive costs does, if the truth be told, to a certain extent depend on the composition by articles of the firm's output (e.g., the sum paid for overtime depends not only on the total output of the firm but also on the wage requirements of the articles manufactured during overtime). However, the change in overall costs which-if the firm's total output is fixed-can be caused by changes in the composition of the output by particular articles is not very great and has therefore been neglected to facilitate analysis.6 (b) In practice the total number of different articles produced by the firm at any particular time is not a matter of indifference, as far as the costs of the firm are concerned. This relation has also been neglected. The first diferential overall cost function (derivative of the overall cost function) G'(x) is U-shaped; indeed, the functions G(x) and G'(x) are defined only for an interval (0, L), where the positive number L is the upper limit of the firm's total output. As x --L, G(x) --oo and G'(x) --oo; furthermore, G'(x) decreases monotonically up to a point XjMin within the above interval, and increases monotonicaLly from this point, i.e., it has an absolute minimum, say G1min, in xmin.
It follows from this assumption that the overall unit cost function
x is also a U-shaped function, which has an absolute minimum, say gmin, at . point XMin (> x), where
6 The decomposition of costs into individual and overall costs roughly corresponds to the direct and indirect (overhead) costs in bookkeeping. This is, however, only a rough and not a precise correspondence. Here, according to what has been said, all progressive costs have been included in the "overall" costs, including those which are, from the bookkeeper's point of view, considered as direct costs.
The value of x is defined as the normal capacity of production. Within the interval (0, x), and only there, the relation (7) g(xf) > G' (xf) holds.
Statistical investigations, engineers' calculations, and logical considerations all show that amidst the conditions of the Hungarian textile industry it is appropriate in the case of short-run decisions generally to use U-shaped differential cost functions.7
It is, moreover, convenient to introduce a so-called variable overall cost function, i.e., the function
and the corresponding variable overall unit cost function,
The value of the latter is equivalent to the tangent of the chord joining the points of abscissae 0 and x on the curve G(x). Let the locus of the minimum of the variable overall unit cost be Xmin, and the minimum value gmin. Then In the present discussion the incentive scheme inducing the firm to attain a maximum profit sum will be called one of sum incentives while that inducing it to attain a maximum profit ratio will be one of ratio incentives.
These are the two types of incentives most frequently mentioned in discussion of the subject, and for this reason it is precisely their comparison that has been made the focus of this investigation. It should be pointed out that in 1959 sum incentives were applied in three branches of light industry (the silk, furniture, and paper industries), while in the remainder-the greater part of the light industries-ratio incentives were used (in a somewhat modified form).
Assumption 7. The demand of the trade fixes an upper limit to the output of each article that may be produced. The firm therefore has certain (positive) limits M1, M2,..., Mn, which are the acceptance limits for the various articles produced. The program is feasible if the individual output of no single article exceeds its acceptance limit. Assumption 8. Unit prices are given for the firm. This corresponds to the general practice, according to which prices are determined by a central price authority. It is true that in some branches of light industry the role of firms in determining prices has lately increased, but this has been ignored in this investigation.
PROGRAMMING
The main difficulty in the mathematical programming task is caused by the fact that the nonlinear function G(x) in the objective function is not uniquely specified, but that only certain properties are assumed. Otherwise, this function is regarded as arbitrary. Thus, in programming, we have to start from the graph (or table) x* may be determined either by direct reading after plotting the graphs of B*(x) and G(x), or, analytically, after plotting the corresponding differential curves and obtaining their points of intersection.
Let us first examine the conditions under which there can be a maximum within the interval (0, M1 + MN2 +... + MA). Applying the usual analytical criterion, the necessary condition that P*(x) should possess an extreme value at an interior point x* of the interval is that It is not difficult to construct a recursive procedure to determine a value of x* that will produce the result in a few steps. In choosing the initial value, it is useful to bear in mind that the firm's optimum total output x* is always positive and may not exceed the normal capacity x. We also know that x* > 0, because for xi -> 0, X2-> 0,..., x -> 0 we obtain Q(xi, X2, * *.., x) -> and thus (0, 0,..., 0) cannot be an optimal program. On the other hand, the linear problem of (51) 
G'(*)
This, however, is only valid in the interval (0, x) (see equation (7)).
SOME PROBLEMS OF PRICE REGULATION
In describing the model, it was postulated in Assumption 8 that prices are given. This is in fact the case in Hungarian industry from the point of view of the firmn. The situation is, however, quite different from the point of view of the price authority which fixes the prices. Precisely because the firm is interested in profit, its decisions are obviously affected by prices.8 The price authority must therefore, as far as possible, fix prices in such a way that the reactions of the firm should correspond to the purposes of general economic policies.
The authors' investigation, after clarifying the behaviour corresponding to the firm's interests with the various types of incentive systems, also used the mathematical apparatus, so far developed, to deal with problems of price regulation. Only three of these problems will now be singled out for discussion.
(i) In the discussions in Hungary it has been proposed to introduce socalled indi//erent prices for practical use. These are supposed to be prices which give the enterprise no reason to prefer producing and selling one article rather than any other. In other words, in a given system of incentives, and with a defined total output for the firm, the price system leads to indifference if the index of profitability of the firm does not change, whatever the composition of articles in the feasible program satisfying the given total output. In the case of a sum incentive system it follows directly from (63) that, for a given total output x, the profit P(xi, X2, .. ., xn) can only be independent of the composition of articles in the program if ( 
65) bix-G(x) = b2x-G(x) . ... bnx-G(x).
Hence the formula for the indifferent price is (66) as ki+ (i-1,2,...I n), where /: is an arbitrary (possibly negative) number, for which all ai's are still positive. It may be seen from formula (66) that if the price system is indifferent for a particular value x of total output, then it will also be indifferent for any value of x, for x does not appear in (66). The situation is different in the case of a ratio incentive system. An argument similar to the preceding one will show that a price system is indifferent for a particular value x of total output if Here, therefore, the price formula depends also on the total output x. It can be noticed, however, that if x # x (the normal capacity), then it follows from the inequality (69) g(x) > g(Q) = gmin (a consequence of (6)) that a feasible program with total output x will be determined instead of the original feasible program with total output x.
The new program with total output x will have the same ratios of individual outputs as the program with total output x, but the cost ratio will certainly be smaller. Indifference is thus also logically equivalent to fixing the total output at the normal capacity level. Thus the formula for an indifferent price is ( where y is an arbitrary constant. The price formulae that would render the price system truly indifferent if they were strictly complied with may thus be theoretically determined. In practice, however, prices will inevitably fail to satisfy the required conditions even if originally determined according to these formulae. Prices are fixed in Hungary for several years, and it is probable that the individual costs of various articles will not change in equal measure after approval of the price; occasional changes in wages will not affect the costs of different articles in equal measure; etc. The indifferent price cannot thus become a part of actual practice. The introduction of profit-sharing incentives inevitably involves a selection between articles by the firm according to considerations of profitability.
(ii) In some cases the economic administration wishes to use the tools of price policy to induce the firm to manufacture certain articles rather than others. There have been instances of this in past practice. Thus, for example, in order to encourage the production of cotton goods that are particularly suitable for export, the foreign trading firms pay the manufacturing firm a surcharge.
In the case of sum incentives, a system of prices can be developed according to which the preference scale of the firm regarding the composition of output coincides completely with the social preference scale considered desirable. The task is the following:
The price authority determines the individual unit costs ki of the articles (on the basis of the calculations of the firm) and in fixing the price, permits the addition of a price margin bi. This must cover the overall costs as well as the firm's profits. The values of the bi's must be chosen so that the socially preferred articles always carry larger price-margins. In this case the firm will follow this order of articles in making up its program.
In the case of ratio incentives, the problem is more complicated. The following formulation of the task must suffice:
What formulae should determine prices in order to ensure that the firm always gives preference to one group of articles, the preferred articles as against the remaining, nonpreferred articles? Let the maximal value of the function G'(x) within the interval 0 < x < X here be called Gax (iii) One of the problems of price regulation by an authority is the size of the profit, for the authority generally endeavours to regulate the difference between the unit price and the whole unit cost more or less uniformly.
In the case of sum incentives, the price authority can influence the firm's total output by determining the magnitude of the profit, for it is easily seen that if the firm is producing according to an optimum program, the following rules will be followed:
(1) If the unit prices are greater than the minimal unit cost (if the articles are profitable), then the output is greater than the normal capacity. The more the unit prices surpass the minimum unit costs, the more will the output exceed the normal capacity. To show this, let us write the profitability conditions Secondly, the optimal output is greater or, at the least, as great as the normal capacity (Figure 8) .
One of the main purposes of the general price adjustments of January, 1959 was everywhere to eliminate prices which were lower than the actual average unit cost, while at the same time ensuring that profits should not be too great. In the case of a sum incentive system, these principles also involve decisions about outputs. Their effect is to ensure that the outputs should somewhat-though not by a great deal-exceed the normal capacity.
(2) If unit price is less than the minimum unit cost (if an article involves a loss), but its price margin is still positive, then output is less than normal capacity and may even be zero. Reformulating the relevant conditions, it may only be stated that i.e., the two graphs are certain not to intersect. In the case of ratio incentives, the relations are of an entirely different nature. Limitations of space do not permit them to be considered here.
THE CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
The authors were unable to recommend a solution relying uniquely on either of the two systems of incentives. Instead, conclusions were deduced showing the economic policies for whose promotion sum incentives are appropriate and those for which ratio incentives are more suitable. The choice must always be made in accordance with the economic policies held valid for a particular sector or branch of industry.
When deciding on which type of incentive system to apply, the economic administration may consider several criteria:
First criterion: What total output do the two types of incentives encourage in the case of short-run decisions?
In the case of sum incentives, the firm's total output is not stabilized so much as with ratio incentives. The firm's total output may, as has been seen in the section on price regulation, be either more or less than the normal capacity, depending on the prices. What is more, in the case of certain prices, as has been shown, the least unfavorable course for the firm, from the point of view of profitability, is not to produce at all. The use of sum incentives is desirable if economic policy requires the firm's total output to be raised above the normal capacity, or if the economic administration wishes to make use of the price system to influence the firm's total output. Sum incentives are expressly harmful if economic policy is aimed at preventing progressive costs from arising, or if the articles are, in the given situation, unavoidably produced at a loss, while there is no way of changing the price and their production is nevertheless necessary. For, in this case, a situation may arise where it is in the interest of the firm considerably to decrease and perhaps even to stop production.
Ratio incentives set a limit to output. The firm never raises total output above normal capacity and often stays under it. On the other hand, it is worthwhile for the firm to produce, whatever prices-are; the cessation of production can never be the optimum decision for the firm (cf. the last paragraph of Section 3).
Ratio incentives are desirable if economic policies require that output be restrained in a particular sector. If this is the case, then the economic ad-ministration may use this method also to prevent the firm from raising its output above the normal capacity.
Second criterion: Which type of incentive system makes programming easier? This criterion must be considered when the economic administration expressly requires that firms draw up programs according to profitability considerations.
Programming is much easier in the case of sum incentives than with ratio incentives. In the first case, the problem may be solved by a relatively simple ordering, while in the second, the solution may only be approximated by the iterative application of similar methods.
Third criterion: If the economic administration wishes to make use of instruments of price policy to influence the firm's programming (e.g., if it wishes to encourage the firm to give preference to socially more important articles), then which system of incentives will enable it to do this better?
Both systems provide an opportunity to do this; but, as has been seen in Section 4, subsection (ii), it is easier and simpler to implement this objective in the case of sum incentives.
There are also other criteria which the economic administration must consider when deciding which form of incentive system to apply. These have been analysed, but they will not be discussed in this brief paper.
The authors do not believe that the concrete programming procedures that have been indicated in this paper will be widely applicable in any direct way to other tasks. The model on which these investigations were carried out bears the marks of the peculiar economic features of Hungarian Socialist industry. This paper has rather been intended to give an idea of the ways in which the problems of the profits and costs of firms are presented to the economists of a Socialist country and how mathematical methods are used in Hungary to elucidate some of the characteristic problems of a planned economy.
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